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CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TRADE 
ARBITRATION COMMISSION IN 2006:   
NEW RULES, SAME RESULTS?  
Benjamin O. Kostrzewa† 
Abstract:   In May of 2005, the China International Economic Trade Arbitration 
Commission (“CIETAC”) was updated with new rules designed to bring it into 
conformity with international arbitration standards.  The rules were the most recent 
efforts by the Chinese government to provide foreign companies with an alternative to 
the Chinese judiciary, which is often considered parochial, unsophisticated, and unable to 
handle modern business conflicts.  The new rules cure many of the problems associated 
with arbitration in China and have created a predominantly fair and professional dispute 
resolution forum.  Currently, CIETAC suffers more from award collection problems 
rather than problems in its rules and procedures.  Arbitration in China must still rely on 
the judiciary for the enforcement of awards.  The Chinese government has reformed 
many aspects of the judiciary to make the enforcement of arbitration awards more 
uniform and just; yet it remains difficult to seize assets in order to satisfy an arbitral 
award.  This Comment analyzes the 2005 changes to the CIETAC rules, and examines 
the Chinese government’s efforts to reform the enforcement of arbitration judgments. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past twenty-five years, the blistering speed of Chinese 
economic development outpaced efforts to reform China’s judicial system.  
The corresponding expansion in legal relationships between foreign and 
Chinese businesses created a demand for forums to hear legal claims.  
Recently, professional arbitration organizations have filled that void as an 
alternative to the Chinese judiciary.1  Foreign corporations, leery of a 
Chinese legal system that is widely considered to be parochial, 
unsophisticated, and unable to handle modern business conflicts, often 
choose private arbitration institutions to resolve disputes.2  
The China International Economic Trade Arbitration Commission 
(“CIETAC”) is the leading arbitration organization for foreign-related legal 
disputes.  CIETAC was established in 1988 out of its predecessor, the 
Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“FETAC”).3  
CIETAC is now the world’s busiest international business arbitration 
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1
  JINGZHOU TAO, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA xiv (2004) [hereinafter TAO].   
2
 Id.  
3
 ARBITRATION IN CHINA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 7 (Jerome A. Cohen et al., eds., 2004) [hereinafter 
Cohen et al.].  
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institution, handling over 850 cases in 2004.4  Yet, in spite of the growing 
volume of cases CIETAC handles, some international observers believe that 
it still has institutional problems that chip away at its objectivity and 
effectiveness.5 
In 2005, CIETAC issued new arbitration rules to address many of the 
problems commonly associated with it.6  Problems with the arbitrator 
selection process and the efficiency of the tribunal were improved to meet 
international norms of arbitration.7  These new regulations are an important 
step for CIETAC towards fully meeting international arbitration standards, 
for they solve many of the systemic defects that plagued the CIETAC 
arbitration process.  
The Chinese government is aware of the importance of arbitration and 
regularly reforms its laws and regulations in order to modernize the legal 
system.  In addition to the CIETAC rules, there have been many changes 
made to the judiciary to make the enforcement of arbitration awards as fair 
as possible.8  The effectiveness of such reforms, however, is often 
questioned.9  Post-award problems in the execution of awards continue to 
plague the Chinese system in spite of reform efforts by the Chinese 
government.10 
However, other problems regularly associated with arbitration in 
China, such as local protectionism, bias against foreigners, and competency 
of the courts, are more a problem of outside perception of CIETAC rather 
than actual institutional defects.11  The widespread reform efforts to ensure 
                                           
4
 Darren Fitzgerald, CIETAC’s New Arbitration Rules: Do the Reforms Go Far Enough?, ASIAN 
DISP. REV., July 2005, at 51. 
5
 See generally Jerome A. Cohen, Time to Fix China’s Arbitration, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 2005, at 
31.  
6
 China Int’l Econ. & Trade Arb. Commission Arb. Rules (Revised and Adopted by the China 
Council for the Promotion of Int’l Trade China Chamber of Int’l Com. on Jan. 11, 2005, effective May 1, 
2005) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.cietac.org (last visited Feb. 9, 2006) [hereinafter CIETAC Arb. 
Rules]. 
7
 Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 51. 
8
  The Chinese government regularly updates and revises its laws.  See generally Jean-Pierre 
Cabestan, The Pol. and Prac. Obstacles to the Reform of the Judiciary and the Establishment of a Rule of 
Law in China, 10 J. CHINESE POL. SCI. 1 (2005) (describing the efforts and difficulties of reforming 
Chinese law). 
9
   See TAO, supra note 1, at xv.  
10
  See generally HU LI, ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AWARD: 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRAL AWARD IN THE P.R. CHINA 148 (2000). 
11
  Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards in the PRC, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 253-255 (2001). 
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the legitimacy of arbitration in China are under appreciated by the business 
community at large.12   
In order to solve both the problems that still remain in the seizure of 
assets to satisfy arbitral awards, as well as the institutional defects that 
remain in CIETAC, the Chinese government must reduce the gap between 
the statutory authority granted by the law and the lack of legal power the 
courts currently hold in China.  Comprehensive redrafting of statutes is an 
important step; however, the Chinese government must also encourage the 
judiciary to become strong and independent. 
This Comment will examine the development of Chinese arbitration 
law.  Part II will discuss international arbitration generally and the 
development of Chinese arbitration.  Part III will analyze the 2005 CIETAC 
revisions and the problems that were cured by the changes.  Part IV will 
examine the post-award legal regime in China and the problems that remain.  
Lastly, this Comment will identify remedies to the real and perceived 
problems that remain after the 2005 arbitration rules in China. 
II. CIETAC HAS DEVELOPED TO MEET INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
STANDARDS 
International arbitration seeks to provide an alternative to traditional 
litigation by allowing the parties to craft a forum that best suits their 
individual needs.13  Rather than the formalism of rules and procedure that 
colors litigation, arbitration offers flexibility, efficiency, and privacy for the 
parties involved.14 
A. International Arbitration Tribunals Share Common Norms  
Though there are dozens of arbitration tribunals and courts around the 
world, they all share similar goals.15  The London Court of International 
Arbitration (“LCIA”), for example, advertises the benefits of arbitration as:  
Maximum flexibility for parties and tribunals to agree on 
procedural matters, speed and efficiency in the appointment of 
arbitrators, including expedited procedures, means of reducing 
                                           
12
  Wang Shengchang, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the People’s Republic of China, in 
IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AND AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK 
CONVENTION 461, 498-99 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1999). 
13
  GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 7 (2d 
ed. 2001). 
14
  Id.  
15
  Id. 
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delays and counteracting delaying tactics, tribunals’ power to 
order security for claims and for costs, special powers for 
joinder of third parties, fast-track option, waiver of first right of 
appeal, costs computed without regard to the amounts in 
dispute, [and] staged deposits.16 
When China signed the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”),17 arbitration became the 
chosen method for international dispute resolution.18  The New York 
Convention internationalized the enforcement of arbitration awards, and this, 
in combination with the rising costs of litigation, made it a more amenable 
forum for international dispute resolution.19  The convention was particularly 
important in China, given the many problems of the judiciary.20  As 
arbitration institutions in China and around the world became better able to 
hear disputes, the number of cases also increased markedly.21  However, the 
phenomenon of arbitration in China is relatively recent.22  Prior to the post-
Mao economic reforms, little arbitration took place in China.23 
B.  Arbitration in China Matured Only After 1978 
Some scholars believe that Chinese culture is more amenable to 
alternative dispute resolution than litigation, citing Confucian values and an 
historical emphasis on mediation.24  The beginnings of modern Chinese 
arbitration can be traced to 1912, immediately after the end of the Qing 
                                           
16
  London Court of International Arbitration, http://www.lcia.org/ARB_folder/arb_main.htm (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2006). 
17
  Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 3, June 10. 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 
[hereinafter New York Convention]; see Notice of the NSC Concerning the Enforcement of the Convention 
on the Recognition And Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Issued by the NSC on April 10, 1987.  
18
  David P. Stewart, National Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under Treaties and Conventions, in 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 163, 164 (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N. Brower 
eds., 1992).  
19
  Id. 
20
  Both Chinese and Western scholars have identified many problems with the judiciary, including 
the competence of judges, the independence of the judiciary, and corruption.  See generally STANLEY 
LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO (1999); Jerome A. Cohen, Reforming 
China’s Civil Procedure: Judging the Courts, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 793, 795 (1997). 
21
  CIETAC cases increased from 267 cases in 1992 to 850 cases in 2004.  Other arbitration 
commissions also saw gains; however, they did not increase at the same pace as CIETAC.  For complete 
statistical information, see Hong Kong International Arbitration Center, International Arbitration Cases 
Received, http://hkiac.org/HKIAC/HKIAC_English/main.html (follow “Statistics” link) (last visited Feb. 
15, 2006).  
22
  JOHN SHIJIAN MO, ARBITRATION LAW IN CHINA 21 (2001).  
23
  Id. 
24
  Ellen S. Reinstein, Finding a Happy Ending for Foreign Investors: The Enforcement of 
Arbitration Awards in the People’s Republic of China 6 (2005). 
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dynasty.25  However, most of the modern system developed after 1978.26  
Prior to that time, China conducted little foreign trade, and international 
arbitration was neither necessary nor important to the economy or politics of 
China.27  
CIETAC developed from several previous organizations, including the 
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (“CCPIT”) and the 
Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (“FTAC”).28  FTAC was established 
in 1956 under the auspices of CCPIT in order to facilitate trade between 
foreign and Chinese companies.29  However, the State Council, one of the 
top organs of the Chinese state, controlled the jurisdiction, structure, and 
final decisions of cases adjudicated by FTAC.30  After the reform period 
began in 1978, FTAC was renamed the Foreign Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission (“FETAC”) and gained scope and strength as 
foreign trade flourished in China.31  Under its new mandate, FETAC could 
hear disputes involving “business transactions and foreign trade contracts 
between foreign and Chinese entities to such disputes between totally 
external parties who may choose China as the arbitration forum.”32  This 
expansion of jurisdiction meant that FETAC could hear cases that were 
wholly outside of China.33  In 1988, upon the promulgation of new 
regulations, FETAC officially changed its name to CIETAC in order to 
underscore the continued changes to its structure.34  
During the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, China withdrew from 
the world.35  The Chinese government refused to sign multilateral 
agreements, and from 1965 to 1979, no scholarly writings on international 
law were published in Mainland China.36  After 1978, however, the Chinese 
government quickly signed nearly forty multilateral agreements in less than 
                                           
25
  TAO, supra note 1, at 1. 
26
  Mo, supra note 22, at 23.   
27
  Id. 
28
  Id. 
29
  TAO, supra note 1, at 17. 
30
  Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 5-6. 
31
  State Council’s Notice Concerning the Conversion of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission 
into the Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (promulgated by the State Council on Feb. 
26, 1980, effective Feb. 26, 1980). 
32
  Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 7. 
33
  TAO, supra note 1, at 18. 
34
  See The State Council’s Official Reply Concerning the Renaming of the Foreign Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission as the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission and 
the Amendment of its Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the State Council June 21, 1988).  
35
  Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 6.  
36
  HUNGDAH CHIU, CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE POST-MAO ERA, 
1978-1987, at 3 (1988). 
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ten years.37  The renewed commitment to arbitration can be traced to the 
Chinese leaders’ desire to benefit from international trade.38  
Most relevant to the enforcement of arbitration was the ratification of 
the New York Convention.39  This Convention provides a basis for CIETAC 
decisions to be enforced in other countries as well as arbitration decisions 
from foreign jurisdictions to be enforced within China.  This was part of 
China’s broader effort to modernize the economy and enter into the world 
community.   
In the 1990s, the jurisdictional scope and international credibility of 
arbitration in China grew as state-sponsored arbitration organizations 
matured.40  The biggest changes to the law were made in 1994, with the 
passing of the Arbitration Law.41  Prior to 1994, arbitration in China was 
governed solely by the Civil Procedure Law, foreign investment legislation, 
and the New York Convention.42  The new Arbitration Law unified and 
institutionalized arbitration as a dispute resolution system for China.43  
These laws comprise the legal framework for arbitration in China.44 
As can be seen from the rapid development of arbitration laws and 
institutions, China’s arbitration system is still relatively new.  Though it has 
roots in the reforms immediately after the 1949 revolution, most of the 
substantial law surrounding arbitration in China was developed after 1978.  
The changes in the 2005 CIETAC Arbitration Rules represent a continuation 
of the development of arbitration in China. 
                                           
37
  Id. at 29-33. 
38
  CHIU, supra note 36, at 3.  
39
  China’s two reservations to the treaty were common:  the first required reciprocity in order for an 
arbitration agreement to be enforced; the second limited arbitration to commercial matters.  See CHENG 
DEJUN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMS AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION PRACTICE 252 (1993). 
40
  Matthew Miller, Disputes Tribunal Powers Widened, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 9, 1998, at 2.  
41
  Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China, (passed on Aug. 31, 1994 by the Nat’l 
People’s Cong., promulgated on Aug. 31 1994 by the Decree No. 31 of the President of the PRC, effective 
Sep. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Arbitration Law]. 
42
  MICHAEL J. MOSER ET AL., HONG KONG AND CHINA ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 305-
306 (1994).   
43
  Cohen et al., supra note 1, at 15.  
44
  Chinese arbitration has typically been divided into domestic arbitrations and foreign arbitrations.  
Domestic arbitrations have different organizations, arbitrators, and are governed by different laws.  Then, 
in 2000, the CIETAC Arbitration Rules were revised to remove jurisdictional distinctions so that domestic 
arbitration could benefit from the advances in foreign arbitration.  Though there are jurisdictional overlaps 
between domestic and foreign arbitration tribunals in China, the original distinctions remain.  See Xiaowen 
Qiu, Enforcing Arbitral Awards Involving Foreign Parties: A Comparison of the United States and China, 
11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 607 (2000).   
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III. THE 2005 CIETAC RULES AND AMENDMENTS HELP CREATE A FAIRER 
AND MORE EFFECTIVE FORUM 
On May 1, 2005, the new arbitration rules went into effect as CIETAC 
attempted to reform some of the institutional problems.45  The changes target 
the arbitrator selection process in order to ensure that only unbiased, 
competent, and objective arbitrators serve on the panel.46  They also 
attempted to cure institutional inefficiencies, grant parties greater autonomy, 
and speed up the arbitration process.47  The new rules have largely cured the 
problems previously associated with CIETAC’s arbitration rules, leaving 
mostly post-judgment enforcement problems.48 
A. The Changes to the Arbitrator Selection Process Create a More 
Impartial Forum 
The selection of arbitrators is one of the most important and 
contentious issues facing CIETAC.49  The arbitration tribunal is the face of 
CIETAC, as the arbitrators on the panel have control over the outcome of the 
decision.  Therefore, a selection process that guarantees an objective 
arbitration tribunal is critical to the legitimacy of CIETAC. 
The 2005 CIETAC rules made substantial changes to how arbitrators 
are appointed.50  The rules create a “list system” for either a sole arbitrator or 
a presiding arbitrator.51  When deciding between the two competing lists, 
“the Chairman of CIETAC shall choose a presiding arbitrator from among 
the common candidates based on the specific nature and circumstances of 
the case, who shall act as the presiding arbitrator jointly appointed by the 
parties.”52  This increases the autonomy of the parties to choose their own 
arbitrators, but it requires that there be common names on both lists.  If there 
is no agreement, the decision will fall back to the CIETAC Chairman.53 
The new regulations also allow for non-CIETAC arbitrators to serve 
on a tribunal.54  Previously, only CIETAC arbitrators could serve on a 
                                           
45
  CIETAC Arbitration Rules (Adopted by the China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade and the China Chamber of International Commerce on January 11, 2005, effective May 1, 2005.)   
46
  Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 51. 
47
  Id. 
48
  Peerenboom, supra note 11, at 3. 
49
  Jerome A. Cohen, Time to Fix China’s Arbitration, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 2005, at 31.  
50
  CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 22(3). 
51
  In the CIETAC Rules, the two parties can elect to have only one arbitrator.  Otherwise, the panel 
will have three arbitrators, with one serving as the presiding arbitrator.  CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 20.  
52
  CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 22(3). 
53
  Id. § 22(4). 
54
  Id. § 21(2). 
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tribunal;55 however, the new rules allow for people who are not on the 
CIETAC panel of arbitrators to serve, subject to approval by the Chairman 
of CIETAC.56 
Disclosure of potential conflicts of interest was a consistent problem 
for CIETAC.57  The revisions made in 2000 required arbitrators to disclose if 
they had a personal interest in the case, and if need be, request removal.58  
However, CIETAC arbitrators often served as personnel within the CIETAC 
organization, which led to a blurring of the lines between CIETAC 
arbitrators and the CIETAC staff.  This created the impression that CIETAC 
as an organization is exerting pressure on the arbitrators to decide a case a 
certain way.59   
Arbitrators are now required to file a declaration of relevant facts that 
could give rise to a conflict of interest.60  Article 25(1) states:  “An arbitrator 
appointed by the parties or by the Chairman of the CIETAC shall sign a 
declaration and disclose to the CIETAC in writing any facts or 
circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his/her 
impartiality or independence.”61  This regulation is an improvement from the 
previous regulations, which did not have a written declaration requirement.62   
In addition, the CIETAC regulations now allow for-cause challenges 
to arbitrators within ten business days of the declaration by the arbitrator.63  
Although the CIETAC chairman is the ultimate adjudicator of such 
challenges, this is another way parties can remove arbitrators. 
B. The Systemic Changes in the New Rules Have Cured Many 
Institutional Defects 
Some of the most important changes in the new rules are to the 
arbitral process.64  As mentioned previously, one of the principal reasons to 
arbitrate a dispute is flexibility.65  Parties are able to craft a dispute forum 
that best suits their needs.  The new CIETAC regulations allow for greater 
                                           
55
  Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 51. 
56
  Id. 
57
  Cohen, supra note 49, at 31. 
58
  CIETAC Arbitration Rules §§ 28-29. 
59
  Cohen, supra note 49, at 31. 
60
  Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 52. 
61
  CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 25(1). 
62
  Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 51. 
63
  CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 26. 
64
  See Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 51. 
65
  See Howard M. Holtzmann, Balancing the Need for Certainty and Flexibility in International 
Arbitration Procedures, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS 
“JUDICIALIZATION” AND UNIFORMITY? 3 (Lillich & Brower eds., 1994). 
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autonomy for both the tribunal and the parties.66  They also make two 
substantial systemic changes that address critical problems of transparency 
and efficiency:  the publication of minority opinions, and the speeding up of 
the arbitration process.67 
Under the new regulations, individual arbitral tribunals, rather than 
CIETAC personnel, have increased powers to shape the nature of the 
hearings.68  The new regulations allow for the arbitral tribunal to “examine 
the case in any way that it deems appropriate unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties,” including whether the hearing will be inquisitorial or adversarial in 
nature.69  The tribunal now decides many of the procedural questions, such 
as the lists of questions, time and topic of pre-hearing meetings, preliminary 
hearings, and the terms of reference.70 
While this seems to give a wide range of options to the arbitration 
tribunal, it gives even more latitude to the parties involved.  Every clause 
that gives power to the tribunals is prefaced by “unless otherwise agreed by 
the parties,” essentially giving them veto power over any possible changes, 
assuming the opposing parties can come to agreement.71  This change should 
be welcome to some observers who saw CIETAC’s paternalism over the 
hearing structures as an impediment to the autonomy of the parties.72 
In fact, parties can avoid the use of the CIETAC rules altogether.  
Under Article 4(2), parties that have agreed to other rules, such as the 
American Arbitration Association or the London Court of International 
Arbitration, may still have their claims heard by CIETAC.73  Additionally, 
new rules have been promulgated for specific industry areas, such as for 
financial disputes.74  
The new regulations also allow for dissenting opinions to be attached 
to the file, though they are not actually part of the award.75  Prior to the May 
2005 regulations, dissenting opinions were not provided to the parties.76  
                                           
66
  Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 51. 
67
  CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 43(4). 
68
   Id. § 29(1). 
69
  Id. §§ 29(1), (3). 
70
  See id. §§ 29, 31, 32, 33(1). 
71
  See, e.g., id. §§ 29, 31, 32, 33(1). 
72
  See Xiaowen Qiu, Note & Comment, Enforcing Arbitral Awards Involving Foreign Parties: A 
Comparison of The United States and China, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 607, 613 (2000). 
73
  The only exception is when “such agreement is inoperative or in conflict with a mandatory 
provision of the law of the place of the arbitration.”  CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 4(2). 
74
  CIETAC Financial Disputes Arbitration Rules (revised and adopted by the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade/China Chamber of International Commerce on Mar. 17, 2005, effective 
May 1, 2005), available at http://cietac.org.cn/english/rules/rules_2.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). 
75
  CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 43(4). 
76
  Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 52.  
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Critics claimed that this practice reduced the transparency of the proceedings 
and limited opportunities to appeal the judgment, as it gave the appearance 
of unanimity.77  In the new regulations, however, Article 43(4) states that 
“[a] written dissenting opinion shall be docketed into the file and may be 
attached to the award, but it shall not form part of the award.”78  This 
provision is a major step toward allowing dissenting opinions, but some 
observers question the language of the provision.79  The term “may” seems 
to allow CIETAC the ability to continue to stifle dissenting opinions as it 
chooses.80  It is unclear how the article will be interpreted.81 
One of the principal changes is to allow faster adjudication of cases by 
reducing the time in which a decision will be made and reducing the 
possibility for a rehearing of the case.  As the quantity of cases CIETAC 
hears has grown, the arbitral fees have increased.82  Because avoiding the 
expense and the delays of the court systems is one of the major advantages 
of arbitration, CIETAC addressed the problem by increasing the power of 
the arbitral tribunal over procedural management, making faster decisions, 
and allowing for more truncated tribunals.83 
CIETAC is attempting to reduce institutional delay by reducing the 
time the panel has to render a decision, as well as other measures.84  After 
criticism over the slow rendering of decisions, under the new regulations the 
arbitration tribunal now has six months to render a decision, rather than the 
nine months previously allotted.85  The time period can be extended only 
with the express consent of the CIETAC Chairman.86 
The new regulations provide for the replacement of an arbitrator or 
continuation of the process without one of the original arbitrators.87  Article 
27 provides procedures for the event that an arbitrator is unable to continue 
his or her duties any time prior to the end of the hearings.88  If the arbitrator 
cannot continue because of withdrawal, resignation, health, or any other 
issue, “a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed within a time period 
                                           
77
  Cohen, supra note 49, at 32. 
78
  CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 43(1). 
79
  See Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 52. 
80
  CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 42. 
81
  Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 51. 
82
  Even a relatively small claim can cost over five thousand U.S. dollars in CIETAC fees alone.  See 
Arbitration Fee Schedule, http://cietac.org.cn/english/fee/fee.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).  
83
  See CIETAC Arbitration Rules §§ 27, 28, 42(1).  
84
  See id. § 42. 
85
  Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 52.  
86
  CIETAC Arbitration Rules § 42(1).  
87
  Id. § 27. 
88
  Id.  
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specified by the CIETAC pursuant to the procedure applied to the 
appointment of the arbitrator being replaced.”89  Though the CIETAC 
Chairman has the final decision whether or not an arbitrator should be 
replaced, the arbitration tribunal “shall decide whether the whole or a part of 
the previous proceedings of the cases shall be repeated.”90  This should 
allow for fewer arbitration interruptions due to an arbitrator being unable to 
fulfill his responsibilities. 
C. The New Rules Leave Unresolved Problems 
The new arbitration rules leave several problems unaddressed.  One of 
the most controversial of these problems is the nationality of the presiding 
arbitrator.91  After a dispute has been properly filed at CIETAC, each party 
may choose one of the arbitrators on the three-person panel.92  The third 
arbitrator, who presides, is jointly agreed upon by the parties, or assigned by 
CIETAC in the event that the parties cannot come to agreement.93  While 
facially this seems to be a fair result, the practical outcome is that the third 
arbitrator is often a Chinese national.94  Also, almost a quarter of the 
arbitrators are from a country other than China.95  Because the Chinese 
corporation is likely to choose a Chinese national and the presiding arbitrator 
is also likely to be a Chinese national, foreign parties may believe that the 
tribunal is biased against the foreign party.96 
This bias, however, may relate more to foreign perceptions of Chinese 
legal attitudes than demonstrable bias in Chinese arbitrators.  The Chinese 
members of the CIETAC panel are all experts in their field, having 
graduated from China’s top law schools.97  Many have also studied law 
abroad.98  Their professional credibility is at stake every time they hear a 
case.  Furthermore, foreign arbitrators are equally likely to have 
relationships with Chinese government institutions, state owned enterprises, 
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90
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92
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  CIETAC Arbitrator Panel List, http://www.cietac.org.cn/english/arbitrators/arbitrators_2.htm (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2006).  
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and private Chinese companies.99  Therefore, attempting to paint Chinese 
arbitrators as being biased against foreign companies based solely on 
nationality seems unfounded.  Furthermore, even absent an explicit 
provision in the CIETAC rules requiring a foreign arbitrator, an attorney 
drafting the arbitration clause may require that the presiding arbitrator be a 
national of a third country.100  Such clauses have been consistently upheld by 
CIETAC.101 
Finally, while some have called for a specific CIETAC regulation 
requiring the presiding arbitrator to be a national of a third country, such a 
regulation might run counter to international arbitration standards.  The 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) 
model arbitration statute states, “[n]o person shall be precluded by reason of 
his nationality from acting as an arbitrator, unless otherwise agreed to by the 
parties.”102  While the UNCITRAL model statute is not binding law on 
CIETAC, it could be considered a normative argument against such a 
provision. 
D. Limited Empirical Evidence Casts CIETAC in a Positive Light 
Empirical evidence regarding the objectivity of CIETAC is limited.  
Given the vast scale of China and the limited access to reliable information, 
comprehensive data collection on arbitration award collection rates is all but 
impossible.103  The few studies done on CIETAC competency were 
overwhelmingly positive, even prior to the 2005 amendment.104  The 
American Chamber of Commerce in Beijing conducted a survey of 
American companies.105  They found that the respondents who had actual 
experience with CIETAC and arbitration in China found it to be fair and 
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  Similarly, foreign arbitrators are often just as well connected in the Chinese business environment 
as their Chinese counterparts.  Also, because the foreign business community in China is still relatively 
small, their professional and social circles are likely to be very close.  This is stated only as a way of 
showing how all arbitrators can become biased, regardless of citizenship or nationality. 
100
  Fitzgerald, supra note 4, at 53. 
101
  Id. 
102
  United Nations Commission On International Trade Law: Model Law On International 
Commercial Arbitration art. 11(1), 24 I.L.M. 1302 (June 10, 1958).  
103
  In addition to the problems of gathering reliable information in China, there are also legal 
restrictions on such studies.  In 1998, the CCP Central Committee created a regulation which requires 
foreign individuals doing research in China with Chinese entities or people to register with the government.  
See Peerenboom, supra note 11, at 258. 
104
  Id. at 249. 
105
  Timothy O. Stratford, Views of American Companies Regarding Arbitration in China, 
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efficient.106  Oddly, those without arbitration experience in China tended to 
have negative views of arbitration in China.107  Furthermore, the foreign 
party won more than half of all CIETAC decisions.  While this statistic is not 
dispositive, it does indicate that concerns of local protectionism are largely 
unsubstantiated.108 
IV. THE CHINESE JUDICIAL SYSTEM’S LAWS FOR ENFORCING ARBITRATION 
AWARDS ARE FAIR AND OBJECTIVE 
The CIETAC hearings are only part of the process.  As is true for all 
arbitration centers, they are unable to enforce arbitration awards without the 
assistance of the courts.109  In China, however, the problems of enforcement 
are exacerbated by other problems in the judiciary. 
Like most countries in the world, China relies on its courts to enforce 
arbitration awards.110  Until recently, after the arbitration tribunal rendered 
an award, the winning party would take the award to a court in the 
jurisdiction where the losing party was domiciled.111  However, under the 
Supreme People’s Court’s Notice on Accession, it is now possible to file in 
the jurisdiction where the assets are located.112  In Chinese law, as well as 
under the New York Convention, a court has a legal obligation to enforce the 
award unless it falls within a few enumerated exceptions.113  This makes 
arbitration awards far easier to enforce in a foreign country than judicial 
decisions.  For judicial decisions from other countries, only principles of 
comity,114 rather than legal obligation, dictate the enforcement of such 
judgments in domestic courts.115 
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A foreign company receiving an arbitration award from CIETAC must 
turn to the Chinese courts in order to get the award enforced.116  The Chinese 
courts are widely considered to be unfair forums for disputes,117 but the 
Chinese government has instituted several critical reforms related to 
arbitration that make the process distinct from the rest of the judicial system. 
A. The PRC Improved the Procedure for Enforcement of Foreign Awards 
In May of 2002 the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) issued a 
directive entitled “Some Issues Concerning the Jurisdiction of Civil and 
Commercial Cases Involving Foreign Elements”118 in which it declared that 
the jurisdiction over arbitration awards is to be limited to a small number of 
Intermediate People’s Courts (“IPCs”)119 near the capital cities of provinces 
and special economic zones.120  This centralization reflects the greater 
sophistication in the cities concerning international business and the 
presence of better-trained, English speaking judges.121  Additionally, in these 
specialized courts there are special sections that deal only with arbitration 
awards.122  This increased sophistication and specialization greatly assists 
the arbitration process because judges are now better able to weigh the 
merits of enforcement and are more familiar with the international business 
environment.123 
B. There Are Limited Grounds for Refusal of Enforcement in China 
After an arbitration award has been set out and an application for 
enforcement has been filed, the courts may still set aside an award on a 
number of enumerated grounds.124  Article 260 of the Civil Procedure Law 
                                           
116
  Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 296. 
117
 See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 280 (2002). 
118
  Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the Jurisdiction of Civil 
and Commercial Cases involving Foreign Elements (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, effective 
Mar. 1, 2002). 
119
  China’s judiciary is divided into a four-level court system.  At the highest is the Supreme People’s 
Court (SPC).  Local People’s Courts are the courts of first instance for most criminal and civil cases, and 
are divided into Higher People’s Courts (HPCs), Intermediate People’s Courts (IPCs), and Basic People’s 
Courts (BPCs).  See generally Congressional-Executive Commission on China, China’s State 
Organizational Structure, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/gov/statestruct.php#spc (last visited Feb. 
16, 2006).  
120
  Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 319-20. 
121
  Id. 
122
  Id. 
123
  Id. 
124
  The enumerated provisions are:  (1) The parties have neither included an arbitration clause in the 
contract nor subsequently reached a written arbitration agreement; (2) the person against whom the 
application is made was not notified to appoint an arbitrator, or take part in the arbitration proceedings; or  
JUNE 2006 CIETAC: NEW RULES, SAME RESULTS? 533 
(“CPL”) provides for four exceptions to enforcement.125  These provisions 
are largely similar to the New York Convention grounds for non-
enforcement.126  While there are some criticisms, such as the lack of 
discretion by the court if they find one of these grounds for refusal, this 
criticism stems more from the differences in common law and civil law 
jurisdictions rather than a substantive disagreement about the law.127  The 
grounds for refusal of enforcement are supplemented by the 1994 Arbitration 
Law, which allows for termination of enforcement in several other 
situations.128 
In addition to the exceptions enumerated by statute, there is a Chinese 
version of the concept of “void against public policy.”129  The Chinese 
version is that a particular act would be contrary to the social and public 
interests of China.130  Though not explicitly defined in Chinese foreign 
arbitration law, the void against public policy language is included in the 
grounds to refuse domestic arbitration agreements and in Article V of the 
New York Convention.131  It has rarely been cited as actual grounds for 
refusal to enforce a foreign-related arbitration award; but at least one case 
has raised such concerns.  In Dongfeng Garments Factory v. Henan 
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Garments,132 the IPC found that in spite of the fact that CIETAC rendered an 
award for the claimant, the enforcement would be against the state and 
public interests of society.  The justification was that the defendant was a 
significant economic factor in the local economic area; therefore, if the 
defendant paid damages it would harm the local economy.133  Fortunately, 
the SPC ultimately overruled this decision by the IPC; otherwise, the IPC 
decision would have confirmed some of the worst fears about the Chinese 
judicial system.  As it stands, the IPC decision raises concerns that without a 
specific statutory definition, the void against public policy argument could 
become a source of government interference in arbitration enforcement.134 
In 1995, the Chinese judicial system further cemented its commitment 
to enforce foreign-related arbitration awards by requiring that all refusals to 
enforce an award be approved by the SPC.135  If the IPC finds grounds for 
refusal to enforce under the Civil Procedure Law, it is required to submit the 
case to the relevant Higher People’s Court (“HPC”).136  From there, the HPC 
can either remand it back to IPC for enforcement, or submit it to the 
Supreme People’s Court for final approval of the refusal for enforcement.137 
This three-tiered review of arbitration awards makes it extraordinarily 
difficult for an arbitration award to be refused.138  Some observers have 
stated that more than eighty percent of the cases submitted to the SPC for 
refusal of enforcement are ultimately rejected.139  This means that only 
twenty percent of cases submitted to the SPC are actually refused 
enforcement.140  This centralized system greatly reduces the possibility of 
local protectionism, as it reduces the opportunity for local officials or judges 
to interfere with the enforcement of arbitration awards. 
These changes to Chinese law have created an environment that, 
contrary to common perception, makes it relatively easy to go to a court and 
enforce an award.  The Chinese government has effectively amended the 
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laws to make it amenable for CIETAC awards to be enforced by local courts, 
overcoming such previous obstacles as local protectionism.  However, there 
are still many difficulties in seizing assets to satisfy an arbitration award. 
V. THE EXECUTION OF ARBITRAL AWARDS IN CHINA REMAINS A 
SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM 
The statutory regime only tells part of the story of award enforcement 
in China.  The practical problems of execution of arbitration awards 
overshadow the problems that arbitration faces generally in China.141  Under 
the CPL and the Enforcement Regulation, courts and enforcement officers 
have the legal authority to enforce awards.142  However, the courts suffer 
from macro-level problems of separation of political powers that limit their 
actual power to seize assets and enforce awards.143   
A. The Courts Have the Requisite Judicial Authority but Not the Legal 
Power to Successfully Enforce Awards  
Enforcement officers suffer from a gap between the authority the law 
purportedly gives them and the lack of power that still haunts the courts 
today and continues to pervade Chinese society.144  Chapter 20 of the CPL 
gives relatively broad powers to enforcement officers,145 including the power 
to garnish wages,146 freeze or auction property,147 evict,148 and other powers 
to seize assets.149  Aside from the physical search and seizure of assets, the 
courts wield a broad array of other powers, including the ability to freeze 
and transfer monies in the banking system.150  
The problem is not in the drafting of the law.  Under the law, 
enforcement officers have broad powers of seizure as well as mechanisms to 
punish those who do not comply.151  However, it is rare for the courts, 
through its officers, to actually use such mechanisms.152  This is often 
blamed on the overall low stature of the Chinese judiciary, though the 
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judiciary has claimed that to use such powers “will prevent the company 
from operating, which could in turn result in greater unemployment and 
social unrest.”153 
B. The Courts Lack the Independence and Strength to Effectively Execute 
Arbitration Awards 
The courts in China suffer from their diminished authority under the 
Leninist system of governance.154  The Chinese judiciary is formally 
independent, but in reality is treated like any other state organ.155  Because 
they treat the judiciary like a bureaucracy, other government organizations 
feel they can ignore judicial orders with impunity.156  Banks have been 
known to notify parties that their accounts were about to be seized157 and 
then transfer the accounts before the courts had a chance to act.158  Banks are 
often reticent to cooperate with the government out of “fear of damaging 
relationships with their customers.”159  Other critics of the system cite 
corruption within the judicial system.  One Chinese lawyer stated that she 
was aware of situations in which court clerks would receive the award and 
then tell the winning party that the losing party did not have the assets to 
pay.160  Though rumors and gossip about such nightmare scenarios are 
widely circulated, they can rarely be corroborated by objective studies.161 
Illegal interference by Communist Party officials is another problem 
many observers fear reduces the power of the courts.162  However, at least 
one survey (perhaps surprisingly) found that Party members and officials 
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were only rarely involved.163  In fact, they have been known to promote 
arbitral enforcement when involved.164  This is welcome news as it 
demonstrates that in spite of the problems of the judicial system, Chinese 
officials recognize the importance of arbitration in China. 
C. Empirical Evidence Demonstrates the Difficulties of Asset Seizure  
Award enforcement statistics show the difficulties of seizing assets.  
Approximately half of all foreign and CIETAC awards were enforced, at 
least to some degree.165  However, in only thirty-four percent of the cases 
could more than half of the award be recovered; and in more than forty 
percent of the cases, less than half of the award was recovered.166 
Attempts at surveying the judiciary directly about arbitration 
enforcement have encountered great difficulty.  In 1997, CIETAC attempted 
to survey the IPCs about enforcement of arbitration awards in China.167  
Only 43 out of 310 courts completed the survey.168  The Chinese state secret 
laws, which are broadly construed, may have made judges reticent to fill out 
the survey.169  Furthermore, professional jealousy and a history of rivalry 
with CIETAC gave the courts little incentive to cooperate.170 
The problem of asset seizure in China will not be solved overnight, as 
it requires systemic changes in many aspects of the Chinese business 
environment.  Changes to the law, financial institutions, and business 
organizations must all be realized before asset seizure becomes more 
reliable.  Unfortunately, the failure of the Chinese arbitration regime to 
guarantee the ability of winning parties to claim their award diminishes all 
of the statutory changes to CIETAC and Chinese law. 
VI. ARBITRATION IN CHINA NEEDS ADDITIONAL REFORM 
Facially, the laws that govern arbitration in China are fair.  However, 
few parties to arbitration would be satisfied with well-written laws 
unsatisfactorily enforced.  China must seek to not only promulgate new 
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laws, but also ensure that parties receive the compensation that a CIETAC 
arbitration award entitles them to. 
A. CIETAC Operations Must Continue to Update and Revise the 
Arbitration Rules 
CIETAC has emerged as the leading dispute resolution forum in 
China, and one of the most sought after forums in the world.171  The new 
CIETAC regulations continue the trend of increased professionalism and 
credibility within the organization.  The greater flexibility in the hearing 
structure, arbitrator selection process, publication of dissenting opinions, and 
the other transparency and accountability issues addressed by the new 
regulations should be commended.  However, CIETAC must continue to 
revise its rules and ensure that they are strictly enforced.  Because arbitration 
is a business, customers must be satisfied with the objectivity of the tribunal.  
Therefore, the most effective way for CIETAC to address these concerns is 
to be as transparent as possible, leaving no room for doubt in its integrity.  
As cases are decided under the new rules, CIETAC, in conjunction with 
international observers, should evaluate the successes and failures of the new 
rules.  Any violations of the regulations or international arbitration norms 
should quickly be made public and the violators should be dismissed.172 
The 2005 amendments to the rules address many, though not all, of 
the defects identified by international scholars.173  There are reports that 
expert witnesses, rather than being called into the hearing, were informally 
contacted outside of the hearing process.174  Perhaps more disconcertingly, 
CIETAC administrators, rather than the tribunal, are known to draft the 
arbitrator opinions and order decisions on certain cases.175  These allegations 
are serious, and CIETAC’s reputation suffers greatly as a result of such 
reports.  As cases are decided under the new rules, CIETAC personnel, in 
conjunction with international observers, should evaluate their successes and 
failures. 
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Finally, the contentious issue of the nationality of the presiding or sole 
arbitrator must still be considered.  If clients continue to feel as though the 
tribunals are not objective as the result of the nationality of the arbitrators, 
those feelings will continue to erode the reputation of CIETAC.  Therefore, 
if the new rules do not clear up perceptions of bias, an amendment that 
forces the presiding or sole arbitrator to be a national of a third country 
should be considered. 
B. Post-Award Problems Can Only Be Solved Through Comprehensive 
Legal Reform 
After the award, the problems within the Chinese judiciary emerge.  
The post-judgment problems are far more difficult to measure or solve, as 
they are relevant to the Chinese judiciary as a whole.  Problems with judicial 
competency, local protectionism, corruption, and a host of other problems 
are well documented.176  
The government is committed, at the very least, to insulating the 
arbitration process from these problems.  Limiting the jurisdiction of 
arbitration awards to a few IPCs with dedicated courts to hear the cases 
allows for more competent, experienced judges to hear cases.177  Many of 
these judges speak English and have gone through training offered by the 
central government.178  The Civil Procedure Law contains multiple 
provisions allowing coercive measures to be employed to reduce obstacles to 
enforcement.179  The direct approval by the SPC for non-enforcement of 
judgments also greatly reduces the risk of local protectionism.180 
In spite of these changes, the courts are still unable to consistently 
seize assets in order to fulfill arbitral awards.  This is not for lack of well-
drafted statutes, but rather the lack of political power and will.  The Chinese 
judiciary must use the law available to it to enforce the arbitral awards.  This 
will only be achieved when the judiciary is able to operate independent of 
the rest of the government.  Therefore, the government must endeavor to 
free the judiciary from the controls of other organs of government and 
encourage it to use its legal power authorized by the National People’s 
Congress.   
In addition to long-term development of the judiciary, the government 
should allow immediate transparency in the system.  Researchers currently 
                                           
176
  Peerenboom, supra note 11, at 276-80.  
177
  Id. at 298.   
178
  Id. at 291. 
179
  See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 124, §§ 100-105. 
180
  Cohen et al., supra note 3, at 334. 
540 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 2 
 
face enormous difficulties in doing empirical research in China; courts are 
unwilling to cooperate because they are afraid of the repercussions of 
providing information to foreign researchers.181  A broad study of arbitration 
and enforcement in China would likely increase the trust in the arbitration 
process, and it would allow for better identification of areas in need of 
improvement.  While the study should ultimately be conducted by an 
objective third-party, governmental cooperation is necessary.  Arbitration is 
expressly limited to commercial activities, so the government has little 
reason to fear such changes in arbitration.182  In fact, a strong, transparent 
arbitration system, like a strong judiciary, can have only positive effects on 
the economy of China.  
The actual execution of awards will likely continue to be difficult in 
China, as better enforcement is contingent upon the reformation of a wide 
swath of Chinese statutes and regulations.183  Essentially, greater success 
rates in the seizure of assets are dependent upon greater transparency and 
access to financial records of corporations by the courts.  Because this 
touches on such disparate topics as corporate formation, bankruptcy, and 
debt, the Chinese government can only improve the rates of successful 
recovery of arbitral awards through comprehensive reform. 
Though such a task is daunting, there is some cause for optimism.  
Lawmakers in China are promulgating new laws that better protect creditors 
by forcing more disclosure.  The new Company Law, which became 
effective January 2006, now requires the disclosure of the company’s legal 
representative, its address, and the names of all shareholders.184  These new 
provisions have the potential to solve many of the problems of finding 
assets.  However, the courts must also have the resolve to use this 
information to enforce arbitral awards. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Arbitration in China has developed at a fast pace over the past thirty 
years, and CIETAC should be commended for its progress.  In that brief time 
period, it has developed into the world’s leading arbitration center, become a 
dependable dispute resolution forum, and assisted in the buildup of China’s 
flourishing market.185  However, because CIETAC is still plagued by the 
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traditional misperceptions linked to the Chinese justice system, the 
government must find ways to eliminate these perceptions.  The principal 
way for this to happen is to maximize transparency; cooperation with 
professionals and academics would allow for greater trust in the system. 
The present condition of arbitration law in China, perhaps like much 
of Chinese law, is not as dire as some analysts would believe.  There are 
operating institutions with objective standards.  The legal regime governing 
arbitration, while far from perfect, offers protection from egregious 
deviations from justice.  However, China must continue to pursue a legal 
environment that encourages the judiciary to act independently of the other 
bodies of government.  Through this, not only will arbitration in China 
improve, but it will also further the overall goal of rule of law in China. 
